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BANKING ON BLOCKCHAIN 
Lissa L. Broome* 
The JOLT Blockchain Symposium held on February 22, 2019, 
was very informative, especially for someone like me who is trying 
to learn about blockchain and distributed ledger technology (DLT) 
and how they might be used in traditional commercial banking. 
Three articles from the Symposium may be found in Volume 20, 
Issue 4 of this journal. They provide background on blockchain, 
discuss the application of securities laws to crypto currency, and 
consider the need for international coordination in regulating 
blockchain. I appreciate the opportunity to participate in the 
Symposium and to offer the comments below based on my talk at 
the Symposium, but a disclaimer is in order. I am a blockchain 
neophyte. I’m still confused about some of the things I have learned 
over the last few months. And, the blockchain ecosystem is 
constantly evolving so that once I think I’m getting it, it changes. I 
am sure that will also be the case with my musings below. 
I was eager to be part of this Symposium because the 
opportunities to employ blockchain or DLT in the financial services 
sector are enormous.1 I will focus on more traditional commercial 
banking activities that might be affected by blockchain since others 
have discussed how blockchain and Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) 
 
 * Burton Craige Distinguished Professor of Law; Director, Center for Banking 
and Finance, University of North Carolina School of Law. Thanks to my research 
assistants for their help with this article: Noah Ganz, Elyse McNamara, and 
especially Devon Tucker. 
 1 See Robert John Kauffman, Chris Parker & Bruce W. Weber, On the Fintech 
Revolution: Interpreting the Forces of Innovation, Disruption and 
Transformation in Financial Services, 35 J. MGMT. INFO. SYS. 220, at 24–25 
(2018), https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/4274/ [https://perma.cc/ 
9GHQ-ZGG5] (pagination reflects document available through appended URL) 
(“In the financial markets arena, blockchain technology is perceived as a game 
changer, as it enables functional improvements, innovations in existing business 
models or even disruption through the creation of new business models and truly 
new products and services . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
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can be used to raise capital for businesses.2 But, the banking industry 
is one of the first industries to leverage the capabilities of 
blockchain.3 
In Part I, I will explore the involvement of banks and others in 
using blockchain for cross-border payments, the transfer of money 
from one country to a person or entity in another country—a 
function previously handled exclusively by banks without 
blockchain technology. Part II will briefly explore other potential 
applications of DLT in banking and discuss the involvement of 
banks with DLT through in-house technology development, 
forming consortia with other banks, or partnering with or investing 
in fintech firms. Fintech is the new buzz word that is short for 
financial technology. Fintech firms use technology to improve 
efficiencies in finance and financial transactions. In Part III, I will 
discuss how fintech firms may get involved in financial services in 
addition to partnerships with banks. Fintech firms may continue to 
operate independently and hope to reduce their regulatory burden 
through uniform state licensing requirements or by operating in 
states that have adopted regulatory sandboxes to encourage 
innovation. Alternatively, fintech firms may wish to consider the 
advantages afforded by operating through a bank charter. Several 
bank charter options are explored: a traditional bank charter, a 
 
 2 See generally Thomas Lee Hazen, Tulips, Oranges, Worms, and Coins – 
Virtual, Digital, or Crypto Currency and the Securities Laws, 20 N.C. J.L. & 
TECH. 493 (2019) (examining applicability of federal securities laws to 
cryptocurrencies and the consequences thereof to transactions that deal in digital 
currencies). 
 3 Blockchain is Reshaping the Banking Sector, MEDIUM (June 6, 2018), 
https://medium.com/universablockchain/blockchain-is-reshaping-the-banking-
sector-fd84f2f9c475 [https://perma.cc/Z989-DR9J] (“Universa [develops 
blockchain solutions for] real sectors of the economy. Banking is one of the most 
promising spheres to benefit from the advantages of blockchain.”); see also IBM 
INST. FOR BUS. VALUE, BLOCKCHAIN REWIRES FINANCIAL MARKETS: 
TRAILBLAZERS TAKE THE LEAD 1 (2016) [hereinafter IBM, TRAILBLAZERS TAKE 
THE LEAD], https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/AY1QE1PK [https://perma.cc/ 
9VCG-YBT8] (noting that “financial markets institutions are among the first to 
leverage the decentralized blockchain platform to define their futures” and that, 
at the time the survey was taken, 14% of the financial markets institutions 
surveyed expected to have blockchains in production and in commercial scale in 
2017). 
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special purpose national bank charter, and a state industrial loan 
company charter. Part IV concludes with a note of caution about 
how the volume and velocity of financial transactions that may be 
created through the use of DLT may have systemic risk implications 
and that this should be considered as we seek to encourage 
innovation in banking and financial services through blockchain and 
DLT. 
I. CROSS-BORDER PAYMENTSJPM COIN, RIPPLE XRP, AND 
OTHERS, INCLUDING FACEBOOK’S LIBRA 
Shortly before the JOLT Blockchain Symposium, JPMorgan 
Chase made a significant announcement on February 14, 2019.4 
JPMorgan Bank did a test transaction with a digital token called 
JPM Coin that instantly settles transfers between clients of its cross-
border payments business.5 The technology uses a private, 
permissioned blockchain6 technology called Quorum, an Ethereum-
based ledger.7 The bank believes that it will be able to extend the 
use of JPM Coin to other standard blockchain networks in the 
future.8 
Why is this significant? It is the first use of a digital coin using 
the distributed ledger technology that underlies other 
 
 4 J.P. Morgan Creates Digital Coin for Payments, J.P. MORGAN: NEWS & 
ANNOUNCEMENTS (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.jpmorgan.com/global/news/ 
digital-coin-payments [https://perma.cc/B8KX-MQND]. 
 5 Hugh Son, JP Morgan is Rolling Out the First US Bank-backed 




 6 For more on permissioned versus permissionless blockchain, see infra notes 
49–54 and accompanying text. 
 7 Madhvi Mavadiya, Stop Calling JPMorgan’s JPM Coin a Cryptocurrency, 
Because it’s Not, FORBES (Feb. 17, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
madhvimavadiya/2019/02/17/jp-morgans-cryptocurrency-jpm-coin-is-not-a-
cryptocurrency/#204514e121d1 [https://perma.cc/XMS5-VPY5]. 
 8 J.P. Morgan Creates Digital Coin for Payments, supra note 4 (“The JPM Coin 
will be issued on Quorum Blockchain and subsequently extended to other 
platforms. JPM Coin will be operable on all standard Blockchain networks.”). 
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cryptocurrencies, like blockchain, by a major U.S. bank.9 And this 
is after Jamie Dimon, the CEO of JPMorgan Chase, bashed Bitcoin 
as a “fraud.”10 Furthermore, JPMorgan is not just any bank; it is our 
nation’s largest bank holding company11 and the world’s sixth 
largest banking company.12 Moreover, according to JPMorgan’s 
website, the JPM Coin is held in designated accounts at JPMorgan 
Chase Bank, N.A., the national bank subsidiary of JPMorgan Chase 
holding company.13 A national bank is highly regulated and has the 
ability to preempt state laws that conflict with its operations 
pursuant to the National Bank Act.14 So, a digital coin issued by such 
a highly regulated entity is a big deal. But even though JPMorgan 
touts the importance of this new technology, it also describes the 
JPM Coin as only a “prototype.” And perhaps my conclusion that 
the regulators had blessed JPM Coin was premature. JPMorgan’s 
website states, “[a]s we move towards production[,] we will actively 
engage our regulators to explain its design and solicit their feedback 
and any necessary approvals.”15 So, it appears that the regulatory 
regime provided by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
 
 9 Son, supra note 5 (“The first cryptocurrency created by a major U.S. bank is 
here – and it’s from J.P. Morgan Chase.”). 
 10 Paul R. La Monica, Jamie Dimon Calls Bitcoin a ‘Fraud’, CNN BUS. (Sept. 
12, 2017), https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/12/investing/jamie-dimon-bitcoin/ 
index.html [https://perma.cc/VC22-BC7K]. 
 11 A bank holding company is “any company which has control over any bank.” 
12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (2012). 
 12 Holding Companies with Assets Greater than $10 Billion, NAT’L INFO. CTR., 
https://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/HCSGreaterThan10B.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/E4UM-HDGM] (last visited June 23, 2019) (stating J.P. Morgan 
Chase & Co. is the nation’s largest bank holding company as of March 31, 2019); 
Kevin B. Johnston, The 10 Biggest Banks in the World, INVESTOPEDIA (May 15, 
2019), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/ 
investing/122315/worlds-top-10-banks-jpm-wfc.asp [https://perma.cc/ARE3-
HNMX] (stating J.P. Morgan is the world’s sixth largest bank holding company). 
 13 J.P. Morgan Creates Digital Coin for Payments, supra note 4. 
 14 See 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008(d)–(e) (2019) (discussing state laws related to non-
real estate lending that are preempted by national bank charters in subsection (d), 
as well as those state laws related to non-real estate lending that are not preempted 
by national banks under Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 
(1996)). 
 15 J.P. Morgan Creates Digital Coin for Payments, supra note 4 (emphasis 
added). 
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for the national bank and the Federal Reserve Board for activities 
that might take place elsewhere in the bank holding company, has 
not yet blessed this application. I was excited for a while, though, 
that there might be a bank-based digital coin, rather than one issued 
by a nonbank company named Ripple16—which, when I was coming 
of age, was the maker of the cheapest wine you could buy.17 
Also, JPM Coin is significant because, although this was only 
one small test-case use of JPM Coin, JPMorgan itself moves $518 to 
$6 trillion19 per day for such wholesale cross-border payments. The 
opportunities for scaling the JPM Coin are significant. 
Ripple’s XRP20 is a token developed by Ripple Labs and 
performs a similar function. In fact, it is the “third most valuable 
cryptocurrency by market value.”21 Ripple has a consortium of over 
200 banks and payment providers on its RippleNet network.22 One 
critical difference between JPM Coin and Ripple XRP is that JPM 
Coin’s value is pegged to the dollar23 and JP Morgan claims that it 
is “the first U.S. bank to create and successfully test a digital coin 
 
 16 See Ripple: Our Company, RIPPLE, https://ripple.com/company/ 
[https://perma.cc/C5DQ-Z6JV] (last visited June 30, 2019) (“Ripple provides one 
frictionless experience to send money globally using the power of blockchain . . . . 
Banks and payment providers can use the digital asset XRP to further reduce their 
costs and access new markets.”). 
 17 Ripple wine was produced by E&J Gallo Winery and “gained popularity 
among college students but was pulled from production in the mid 80s with little 
explanation as to why.” Lauren Eads, Top 10: Where Are They Now, DRINKS BUS. 
(Mar. 31, 2014), https://www.thedrinksbusiness.com/2014/03/top-10-demised-
drinks-brands/5/ [https://perma.cc/5RG2-8SQT]. 
 18 Alastair Marsh, JPMorgan’s Crypto Coin Puts Ripple’s Relevance in 
Question, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2019-02-14/jpmorgan-s-crypto-experiment-raises-ripple-relevance-
question [https://perma.cc/UK2U-JG6N] (“JPMorgan . . . moves more than $5 
trillion in wholesale payments each day . . . .”). 
 19 Son, supra note 5 (“[JPMorgan] moves more than $6 trillion around the world 
every day for corporations in its massive wholesale payments business.”). 
 20 XRP: The Digital Asset for Payments, RIPPLE: XRP, https://ripple.com/xrp/ 
[https://perma.cc/C93D-JUP5] (last visited July 4, 2019). 
 21 Marsh, supra note 18 (stating that Ripple XRP’s market value is about $12.6 
billion). 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
174 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 21: 1 
representing a fiat currency.”24 Over time, JPMorgan believes it can 
extend JPM Coin to be tied to other currencies.25 Conversely, 
Ripple’s XRP is not pegged to a currency; as a result, its value 
fluctuates. For instance, in early 2018 its value was pegged at three 
dollars, but in mid-February 2019, its value was at about thirty 
cents.26 
JPM Coin is an example not only of a recent change, but also of 
the contradictions between news reports and the confusion of those 
trying to understand this brave new world of DLT experience. Is 
JPM Coin a path-breaking digital coin or is it a database disguised 
as a coin?27 Is JPM Coin a “direct threat”28 to Ripple’s XRP or does 
it validate XRP?29 Is JPM Coin “faster, cheaper and more reliable” 
than SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Institute for Financial 
Telecommunication)30 and mean the end of the SWIFT wire transfer 
system or will SWIFT’s GPI (Global Payments Innovation) provide 
 
 24 J.P. Morgan Creates Digital Coin for Payments, supra note 4; see also John 
Detrixhe & Matthew De Silva, What Does JPMorgan See in Crypto Now That it 
Didn’t Before?, QUARTZ (Feb. 14, 2019), https://qz.com/1550767/what-does-
jpmorgan-see-in-crypto-now-that-it-didnt-before/ [https://perma.cc/V6XK-
DYSK] (stating that several institutions have previously issued a “fiat-based 
crypto token,” but JPM Coin is the first issued by an institution of JP Morgan’s 
reputation). 
 25 J.P. Morgan Creates Digital Coin for Payments, supra note 4. 
 26 Marsh, supra note 18. 
 27 Austin Clark, Mixed Response to JP Morgan’s Digital Currency Launch, 
GLOBAL TREASURER, https://www.theglobaltreasurer.com/2019/02/18/mixed-
response-to-jp-morgans-digital-currency-launch/ [https://perma.cc/4PVF-
TYXX] (last visited June 23, 2019) (stating JPM Coin is “not ground breaking in 
terms of technology” and since it uses a permissioned blockchain network it “is 
essentially a database managed by” JPMorgan Chase). 
 28 Marsh, supra note 18. 
 29 Gary McFarlane, JP Morgan’s Surprise JPM Coin Launch a Threat to Ripple 
or a Godsend?, TODAY’S GAZETTE: CRYPTOCURRENCY/BLOCKCHAIN NEWS 
(Feb. 14, 2019), https://todaysgazette.com/jpmorgans-surprise-jpm-coin-launch-
a-threat-to-ripple-or-a-godsend/ [https://perma.cc/ZUS2-23L6] (stating that JPM 
Coin “could . . . work to Ripple’s advantage by waking up the skeptics to the 
blockchain possibilities” and providing an “off-the-peg solution from Ripple”). 
 30 Penny Crosman, Can JPMorgan Chase’s JPM Coin Knock Off Ripple and 
Swift?, AM. BANKER (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.americanbanker.com/ 
news/can-jpmorgan-chases-jpm-coin-knock-off-ripple-and-swift 
[https://perma.cc/4XQV-7HLS]. 
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the speed and transparency to make JPM Coin, Ripple’s XRP, and 
other DLT payment systems superfluous?31 
Following the JOLT Blockchain Symposium, another major 
bank, Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. announced in June 2019 its intent 
to follow JPMorgan’s lead and introduce a stable coin.32 Stable 
coins, like JPM Coin, are pegged to a fiat currency or a basket of 
other assets with lower price volatility than other cryptocurrencies 
like Bitcoin.33 Goldman’s CEO, David Solomon, told a French 
newspaper that Goldman Sachs is “‘absolutely’ looking at digital 
currencies”34 and that the investment bank “is conducting ‘extensive 
research’ on tokenization, the process for transforming currencies or 
assets into tradeable digital contracts that live on a blockchain.”35 
Solomon also said that you can “[a]ssume that all major financial 
institutions around the world are looking at the potential of 
tokenization, stable coins and frictionless payments.”36 He further 
stated that “blockchain-based stable coins tied to real currencies are 
‘the direction in which the payments system will go.’”37 
On June 17, 2019, Ripple announced a strategic partnership with 
Money Gram to provide “cross-border payment and foreign 
 
 31 Jide Idowu, SWIFT Believes Its GPI Payment Tracker is Outperforming 
Ripple’s Blockchain, ZYCRYPTO (Feb. 13, 2019), https://zycrypto.com/swift-
believes-its-gpi-payment-tracker-is-outperforming-ripples-blockchain/ 
[https://perma.cc/C8HB-9BPQ]. 
 32 Alastair Marsh, Goldman Sachs Explores Creating a Digital Coin Like 
JPMorgan’s, BLOOMBERG L. (June 28, 2019), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/ 
product/blaw/document/X4DFL6Q0000000?bna_news_filter=banking-
law&jcsearch=BNA%25200000016b9e57debdab7b9 
eff80b80000#jcite [https://perma.cc/J45C-FDX8] [hereinafter Marsh, Goldman 
Sachs Explores Creating a Digital Coin]. 
 33 See Olga Kharif, Why (Almost) Everybody Hates Facebook’s Cryptocurrency 




[https://perma.cc/4PHC-VJGM] (describing stable coins). 
 34 Marsh, Goldman Sachs Explores Creating a Digital Coin, supra note 32. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
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exchange settlement using digital assets.”38 This new partnership 
was overshadowed by the blockbuster announcement the very next 
day, June 18, when Facebook released a White Paper regarding its 
plans to create a permissioned DLT to issue a stable coin called 
Libra.39 An “independent, not-for-profit membership 
organization”40 called the Libra Association, will issue “Libra” 
stable coin tokens backed by a “basket of major government-issued 
currencies . . . or highly liquid government bonds.”41 In conjunction 
with the Libra Association, Facebook also created a new subsidiary, 
“Calibra,” which is to serve as “a digital wallet to aid transactions.”42 
The focus of Libra is “billions of people”43 around the globe, rather 
than sophisticated business customers of large global financial 
institutions targeted by JPM Coin. Libra, if it comes to pass, has 
“massive” “potential to disrupt incumbent banking in the developed 
world.”44 Not surprisingly, given the size and power of Facebook 
and its ability to leverage private information about its users, the 
Libra announcement has been met with widespread concern.45 
Among those expressing concern are Federal Reserve Board 
 
 38 Robert Kim, Facebook, FATF, Ripple Push Crypto Regulatory Maturity, 
BLOOMBERG L. (June 27, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ 
bloomberg-law-analysis/analysis-facebook-fatf-ripple-push-crypto-regulatory-
maturity [https://perma.cc/8E8K-U5KL] (noting that this partnership received 
relatively little attention but may be of “comparable significance” to Facebook’s 
Libra announcement). 
 39 LIBRA ASS’N MEMBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO LIBRA 8 (2019) [hereinafter 
LIBRA WHITE PAPER], https://libra.org/en-US/wp-content/uploads/sites/23/ 
2019/07/LibraWhitePaper_en_US-Rev0723.pdf [https://perma.cc/29QE-D77C]. 
 40 Preston Brewer, Analysis: Facebook’s Libra Ducks the SEC, Drawing New 
Attention, BLOOMBERG L. (June 26, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ 
bloomberg-law-analysis/analysis-facebooks-libra-ducks-the-sec-drawing-new-
attention [https://perma.cc/R2NS-M9JA]. 
 41 Dirk A. Zetzsche et al., Regulating Libra: The Transformative Potential of 
Facebook’s Cryptocurrency and Possible Regulatory Responses 4 (European 
Banking Inst. Working Paper Series 2019/44, Univ. of New S. Wales Law 
Research Paper Series 19-47, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=3414401 [https://perma.cc/X98T-EHL7]. 
 42 Brewer, supra note 40; see LIBRA WHITE PAPER, supra note 39, at 3. 
 43 LIBRA WHITE PAPER, supra note 39, at 1. 
 44 Zetzsche et al., supra note 41. 
 45 Kharif, supra note 33. 
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Chairman Jerome Powell, U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, 
and European regulators.46 
Banks will be affected by cryptocurrency payments with digital 
tokens either because they are pioneering new DLTs or trying to 
ensure that their traditional payment systems can compete with DLT 
payment systems developed by othersbanks or nonbanks like 
Facebook. Who will actually develop these technologies and which 
will be successful? Stay tuned. 
II. BLOCKCHAIN BANKING APPLICATIONS 
A. Blockchain Applications 
So, what are the banking applications for blockchain? The single 
most frequently mentioned application is the wholesale payment 
space like that tackled by JPM Coin and Ripple’s XRP.47 The hope 
is that DLT will provide greater speed, reduce costs, and solve the 
 
 46 Id. (stating that Powell has “serious concerns,” Mnuchin is worried about 
Libra as “national security issue,” and the “European Central Bank, the Bank of 
England and France’s finance minister all weighted in which worries”). 
 47 IBM, TRAILBLAZERS TAKE THE LEAD, supra note 3, at 8 (stating a survey of 
businesses ranked wholesale payments as the first area to benefit from cost 
savings from DLT); see also Saifedean Ammous, Blockchain Technology: What 
is it Good for? 1, 2–3 (Leb. Am. Univ., Aug. 8, 2016), https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2832751 [https://perma.cc/NA82-95SB] (stating that digital payments, 
contracts, and database and records management are three applications for DLT); 
Blockchain is Reshaping the Banking Sector, supra note 3 (“The main areas in 
which banks and other financial institutions will be able to implement blockchain 
technology are reducing costs and making bank-to-bank and international 
transfers faster.”); Jo Lang, Three Uses for Blockchain in Banking, BLOCKCHAIN 
PULSE: IBM BLOCKCHAIN BLOG (Oct. 23, 2017), 
https://www.ibm.com/blogs/blockchain/2017/10/three-uses-for-blockchain-in-
banking/ [https://perma.cc/SJ9D-EUPZ] (listing payments, customer 
identification, and trade finance as three crucial DLT applications); Narseen 
Quibria, Blockchain Holds Promise for Cross-Border Payments, AM. BANKER: 
BANKTHINK (Aug. 7, 2015), https://www.americanbanker.com/ 
opinion/blockchain-holds-promise-for-cross-border-payments 
[https://perma.cc/9VJ4-W3JS] (“The blockchain could be particularly effective in 
improving cross-border payments, more specifically correspondent banking, 
business-to-business payments and peer-to-peer remittances. Each of these areas 
involve numerous inefficiencies.”). 
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double spending problem that is inherent in digital currency.48 Libra 
brings a potential payments application to the consumer space. 
I assume (always dangerous) that there is a critical distinction 
between a permissionless blockchain and a permissioned 
blockchain.49 With banking applications, I again make a dangerous 
assumption that the applications that have been developed or are 
being discussed are all permissioned.50 I assume this because banks 
must track transactions and report suspicious activity to federal 
regulators.51 Permissioned blockchain, where consortium members 
control membership, may make this possible.52 Permissionless 
blockchain probably does not accommodate these necessary 
functions. If that is the case, does the permissioned blockchain solve 
some of the areas of conflict regarding the supposed advantages of 
DLT? For instance, some have said that when processing power is 
considered, the costs and efficiencies of blockchain may not be as 
great as advertised.53 Others have asked whether these DLT 
applications can indeed scale given the storage and computational 
 
 48 PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW: THE 
RULE OF CODE 63 (2d ed. 2018) (“Bitcoin enabled parties to transfer a digital 
currency, without the need for a centralized coordinating party and without the 
risk of double spending.”); Quibria, supra note 47 (stating that “[w]ithout 
middlemen, the fees, transactions times and opacity that have plagued legacy 
cross-border payments can become a thing of the past” in a system utilizing 
blockchain technology). 
 49 See DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 48, at 31–32. A permissioned 
blockchain requires permission to join; a permissionless blockchain is open to all 
and participants may maintain their anonymity. Bitcoin and Ethereum are 
permissionless blockchain. 
 50 See, e.g., STEVE ODELL & JULIA FADZEYEVA, EMERGING TECHNOLOGY 
PROJECTION: THE TOTAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF IBM BLOCKCHAIN 31 (Forrester 
Research, Inc., 2018), https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/QJ4XA0MD 
[https://perma.cc/429W-MC7D] (reporting findings from study commissioned by 
IBM). 
 51 Crosman, supra note 30 (stating that anti-money laundering and know your 
customer concerns are lessened with a closed network); see DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, 
supra note 48, at 31. 
 52 Crosman, supra note 30; see DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 48, at 31. 
 53 Ammous, supra note 47, at 4 (“[T]he storage and computational burden on 
network members will eventually become too large for network members to 
handle as the network size grows.”). 
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burdens involved, as well as whether the transactions are at risk of 
being hacked.54 Or, are these issues for any DLT? 
Other potential banking applications that have been mentioned 
in the literature, in addition to those discussed elsewhere in the 
Symposium, include: 
• Smart contracts that run on DLT to:55 
o Issue margin calls, 
o Transfer collateral in case of default, 
o Net transactions, 
o Exercise options embedded in derivatives; 
• Collecting and sharing data for regulatory purposes;56 
• Customer identification for know your customer regulations 
(versus anonymous transactions on the Dark Web with 
permissionless bitcoin);57 
 
 54 Id. at 5 (“[Security] is compromised by operating on a shared ledger which 
opens up many possibilities for security breaches to take place.”). 
 55 DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 48, at 74–88; Ammous, supra note 47, at 
2–3; Alexandros L. Seretakis, Blockchain, Securities Markets and Central 
Banking (manuscript at 10) (July 23, 2017), in REGULATING BLOCKCHAIN. 
TECHNO-SOCIAL AND LEGAL CHALLENGES (Philipp Hacker, Ioannis Lianos, 
Georgios Dimitropoulos & Stefan Eich eds., Oxford Univ. Press, 2019), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3007402 [https://perma.cc/NP69-B99M]. 
 56 Seretakis, supra note 55 (manuscript at 16) (“The promise of distributed 
legers lies in their ability to create a record of information that is updated and 
shared by participants.”); Elizabeth S. Ross, Note, Nobody Puts Blockchain in a 
Corner: The Disruptive Role of Blockchain Technology in the Financial Services 
Industry and Current Regulatory Issues, 25 CATH. U.J.L. & TECH 353, 376 (2017) 
(“[A] shared repository with real-time access to data will facilitate transparency 
between regulators and regulated entities.”). 
 57 Blockchain is Reshaping the Banking Sector, supra note 3 (“Another field of 
blockchain application in the banking industry is for the creation of a client 
identification system based on the distributed ledger technology.”); Lang, supra 
note 47 (stating blockchain technology can assist with know your customer and 
sharing customer information across the company); Martin Arnold, Five Ways 
Banks Are Using Blockchain, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2017), 
https://www.ft.com/content/615b3bd8-97a9-11e7-a652-cde3f882dd7b 
[https://perma.cc/2UJV-FL2Z] (“[Many fintech startups are] working on building 
blockchain systems for customer identification . . . .”). 
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• Syndicated lending;58 
• A nationwide Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 filing 
system.59 
These and other areas are the next frontiers for banks and fintech 
firms trying to exploit DLT to disrupt traditional banking services. 
B. Level of Bank Involvement in Blockchain 
Given all these possibilities to explore utilizing DLT in banking, 
how are banks sticking their toes in the blockchain water? Some, 
like JPMorgan Chase and now Goldman Sachs, are developing their 
own products in-house. Bank innovation may be enhanced by the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the regulator of 
nationally chartered banks, which sought comments in April 2019 
on an Innovation Pilot Program that would permit national banks, 
“including those engaging a third-party to offer an innovative 
activity” to receive “regulatory input early in the development of 
proposed innovative activities.”60 The program’s focus is on “new 
or unique activities where uncertainty is perceived to be a barrier to 
development and implementation.”61 Banks may establish small, 
short-term pilots “to determine feasibility or consider how a large-
scale activity might work in practice.”62 Banks are also getting 
 
 58 IBM, TRAILBLAZERS TAKE THE LEAD, supra note 3, at 5; DE FILIPPI & 
WRIGHT, supra note 48, at 92 (noting that settlement times for syndicated loan 
credits can be nineteen days, creating liquidity concerns and financial risk that 
could perhaps be ameliorated by DLT); Arnold, supra note 57 (stating numerous 
financial institutions are starting to put syndicated loans on DLT). 
 59 Juan Delacruz & Udit Sharma, Collateral Damage Over Credits or Security 
Assets? Try Blockchain, BLOCKCHAIN PULSE: IBM BLOCKCHAIN BLOG (Dec. 11, 
2018), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/blockchain/2018/12/collateral-damage-over-
credits-or-security-assets-try-blockchain/ [https://perma.cc/QP9L-MB66] 
(suggesting a “blockchain-based UCC platform”). 
 60 OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC INNOVATION PILOT 
PROGRAM 2–3 (2019), https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/responsible-innovation/ 
occ-innovation-pilot-program.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9G3-MEJ4]. 
 61 Id. at 3 (“Th[is] program is intended to provide a consistent and transparent 
framework for eligible entities to engage with the OCC on pilots, which are small-
scale, short-term tests to determine feasibility or consider how a large-scale 
activity might work in practice.”). 
 62 Id. at 2. 
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involved in DLT by joining with other banks in consortia to explore 
and develop DLT and applications. For instance, R3,63 an enterprise 
blockchain firm owned by forty large lenders,64 is developing a DLT 
platform for enterprise usage. The most prevalent level of 
involvement of banks in blockchain is “investing in blockchain 
solutions” in one form or another with fintech firms, which over 
ninety-percent of banks are reportedly doing.65 
III. FINTECH FIRMS ENGAGING IN BANKING ACTIVITIES 
Thus far, this paper has addressed banks exploring blockchain 
applications. This Part explores how fintech firms are using DLT or 
other financial technology to deliver traditional banking services.66 
Fintech firms may wish to move forward on their own providing 
money transmission services. In most states, the fintech firm will 
need to obtain a license from the state to engage in money 
transmission or a money services business. Obtaining licenses in 
every state in which the fintech engages in business can be time-
consuming and costly. One solution is uniform state regulation and 
supervision. For instance, twenty-three states67 have already joined 
 
 63 About R3: Who We Are, R3, https://www.r3.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/ 
ZR3R-MEQ7] (last visited July 3, 2019) (“R3 is an enterprise blockchain software 
firm working with a broad ecosystem of more than 300 participants across 
multiple industries from both the private and public sectors to develop on Corda, 
its open-source block chain platform, and Corda Enterprise, a commercial version 
of Corda for enterprise usage.”). 
 64 Arnold, supra note 57. 
 65 Lang, supra note 47 (according to an IBM Institute for Business Value 
report). 
 66 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES 
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES: NONBANK FINANCIALS, FINTECH, AND INNOVATION 
66–80 (2018) [hereinafter TREASURY REPORT]. Indeed, in its report on nonbank 
financials, fintech, and innovation, the Treasury noted that “[t]he diversity of U.S. 
financial services firms requires that any regulatory solution allow for recognition 
of a broad spectrum of business models,” id. at 66, all of which must be considered 
in the process of modernizing the applicable regulatory framework, id. at 67. 
 67 Thus far, the twenty-three states that have joined the Vision 2020 initiative 
include California, Connecticut, Georgia, Iowa, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Nebraska, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, 
Washington, and Wyoming. 23 States Join Multistate Licensing Agreement for 
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the Conference of State Bank Supervisors’ (CSBS) “Vision 2020,” 
the ultimate goal of which is “to streamline nonbank supervision”68 
of these money transmission services. 
Some states have created so-called regulatory sandboxes to 
establish (or maintain) an attractive environment for fintechs to 
experiment and innovate with new products and services without 
concern regarding compliance with state licensing statutes or other 
regulations while the fintech is developing its product or service.69 
These sandboxes are akin to the OCC’s Innovation Pilot Program, 
but are open to any entity, not just to nationally chartered banks 
regulated by the OCC. On March 25, 2019, Utah followed the lead 
of Arizona and Wyoming and became the third state to enact 
regulatory sandbox legislation.70 Utah’s legislation also expressly 
includes blockchain technology in its list of permitted activities.71 
Moreover, the Utah State Attorney General has stated that this 
includes certain cryptocurrencies or cryptocurrency products as 
well.72 There is a chance that this will prove useful to fintech firms 
seeking to expand into the realm of banking. 
Fintech firms may also consider whether it is to their advantage 
to become banks themselves and provide the technology-enabled 
services they offer directly to bank customers. Although banks are 
heavily regulated entities, there are advantages that they enjoy that 
are not available to regular commercial firms which might induce a 
 
Financial Services Companies, CSBS: PRESS RELEASES (June 24, 2019), 
https://www.csbs.org/23-states-join-multistate-licensing-agreement-financial-
services-companies [https://perma.cc/N3Q8-HZSH]. 
 68 Rachel Witkowski, State Regulators Expand Multistate Licensing Process 
for Fintechs, AM. BANKER (June 25, 2019, 5:46 PM), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/state-regulators-expand-multistate-
licensing-process-for-fintechs [https://perma.cc/K4C6-UTXM]. 
 69 Anthony C. Kaye, Utah’s New Regulatory Sandbox, BALLARD SPAHR LLP 
(June 11, 2019), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2019/06/11/utahs-
new-regulatory-sandbox/# [https://perma.cc/F3HZ-E6E9]. 
 70 H.B. 378, 63d Leg., 2019 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2019) (“This bill . . . creates a 
regulatory sandbox program in the Department of Commerce, which allows 
participants to temporarily test innovative financial products or services on a 
limited basis without otherwise being licensed or authorized to act under the laws 
of the state . . . .”); Kaye, supra note 69. 
 71 Kaye, supra note 69. 
 72 Id. 
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fintech firm to explore providing its services through a bank charter. 
These advantages include: access to the federal payments system,73 
access to discount window lending from the Federal Reserve 
Banks,74 and federal deposit insurance which allows a bank to raise 
funds from depositors (with less than $250,000 on deposit) at a risk-
free rate, since the deposits are fully insured by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC).75 Federal law also permits national 
and state banks to charge interest at the rate allowed in the state 
where the bank is headquartered irrespective of the interest rate 
limits in the state where the customer resides, effectively allowing 
banks to export state usury laws (or the lack thereof) to apply to out-
 
 73 The twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks provide services for banks that 
include “maintain[ing] accounts for reserve and clearing balances and provid[ing] 
various payment services, including collecting checks, electronically transferring 
funds, and distributing and receiving currency and coin.” Federal Reserve’s Key 
Policies for the Provision of Financial Services, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. 
RESERVE SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/pfs_about.htm 
[https://perma.cc/9X6J-GSAU] (last updated Oct. 28, 2016). 
 74 The twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks make short-term loans to banks 
at the discount rate set by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. Although the 
discount rate is generally somewhat higher than the interest rate that would be 
charged by another lender for short-term credit, the Federal Reserve banks’ 
discount window lending, the Fed is viewed as the “lender of last resort” and 
discount window lending is thought of as part of the government safety net for 
banks as an assured source of credit when needed. The Discount Rate, BD. OF 
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
monetarypolicy/discountrate.htm [https://perma.cc/ST4N-FNDF] (last updated 
May 28, 2019). 
 75 Deposit Insurance FAQs, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 
https://www.fdic.gov/deposit/deposits/faq.html [https://perma.cc/UH7C-3J8H] 
(last updated Jan. 31, 2018) (describing deposit insurance for banks). Banks are 
primarily funded by deposit liabilities, many of which (demand deposits) are 
repayable upon the customer’s demand. LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. 
MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 155–57 (5th ed. 2017). However, since the customer (if fully insured) 
bears no risk of loss, the interest rate paid to deposits is a low, risk-free interest 
rate. Id. Much of the elaborate regulatory structure applicable to banks, including 
restrictions on their activities, is motivated by a desire to ensure the safe and sound 
operations of the bank so that the FDIC will not be presented with the costs of a 
bank failure and payoff of the insured depositors. Id. 
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of-state borrowers.76 A nationally chartered bank has an additional 
benefit: the ability to preempt state consumer financial laws that 
“prevent or significantly interfere[] with the exercise by the national 
bank of its powers.”77 
Fintech firms interested in seeking a bank charter have three 
different routes.78 The first is to seek a state or national bank charter 
along with deposit insurance from the FDIC. The second is through 
the OCC’s newly created special purpose national bank charter, 
which provides all of the advantages of a bank charter, including the 
ability of a national bank to preempt state laws. The third is a state 
charter available in only a handful of states which is referred to as 
an industrial loan company or industrial bank charter. Each option 
is explored further below. 
A. State or National Bank Charter 
The most direct way for fintech firms to enter banking is to seek 
to establish a bank charter. This can be done either pursuant to a 
state’s bank chartering authority or from the OCC under the 
National Bank Act.79 In addition to receiving a charter, the bank 
 
 76 12 U.S.C. §§ 85 (national banks), 1831d (state banks) (2012); Marquette 
Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978) 
(holding that a national bank is “located” in the state where it is headquartered 
and not where its customers reside). In many cases, banks that only issue credit 
cards will locate in a state that has no limit on interest rates, late fees, or other 
components of interest so they are not bound by the more restrictive interest rate 
regulations in other states. Lalita Clozel, Square’s Bid to Be Industrial Bank 
Inflames ILC Debate, AM. BANKER (Sept. 6, 2017), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/square-to-apply-for-industrial-bank-
inflaming-ilc-debate [https://perma.cc/ZEL9-K34H]; Rachel Witkowski, Are 
Fintechs Better Off Taking the ILC Route to Banking?, AM. BANKER (Jan. 21, 
2019, 10:00 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/are-fintechs-better-
off-taking-the-ilc-route-to-banking [https://perma.cc/W2W5-NQ5K] [hereinafter 
Witkowski, Are Fintechs Better Off Taking ILC Route]. 
 77 12 U.S.C. § 25b (2012) (referencing Barnett Bank of Marion County v. 
Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996), the case that established this preemption standard). 
 78 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 66, at 66 (describing these alternative 
business models). 
 79 The procedures for organizing a national bank are detailed in 12 C.F.R. § 5.20 
(2019). Most state chartering authorities follow similar procedures. See, e.g., N.C. 
GEN. STAT. §§ 53C-3-1 to -7 (2019). 
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must also be approved by the FDIC to receive deposit insurance 
before it is permitted to accept deposits.80 
The main drawback to this straightforward approach is the 
limitation on the activities the bank may undertake. If a fintech firm 
becomes a bank, it may only engage in the business of banking, as 
defined by the chartering authority.81 Likewise, if a fintech firm 
owns a bank, it will be considered a bank holding company, and any 
of its activities or the activities of its nonbanking subsidiaries will 
be limited to those that have been found to be “closely related to 
banking” under the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA).82 The 
BHCA is administered by the Federal Reserve Board, an additional 
regulator, which focuses on the holding company and its 
nonbanking subsidiaries.83 
To form a bank, either the state chartering authority or the OCC 
must grant permission for the charter, and the FDIC must authorize 
deposit insurance. None of these permissions are a foregone 
conclusion for an entity that is, or is owned by, a fintech company. 
For instance, one fintech company in 2018, Varo Money, sought to 
 
 80 See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S 
LICENSING MANUAL 37 (2016) (stating that the OCC requires FDIC deposit 
insurance for all national bank charter applications except or certain special 
purpose charters such as trust companies or trust banks); see also, e.g., N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 53C-3-7(a)(3) (stating that North Carolina will not issue a bank charter 
until the proposed bank has “[s]ecured deposit insurance from the FDIC”). 
 81 For national banks, this is defined in 12 U.S.C. § 24 (seventh), and includes 
“all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of 
banking” and then lists certain enumerated powers including taking deposits, 
making loans, and negotiating checks. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (seventh) (2012). The 
powers of state banks are defined in state statutes. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 53C-5-1 (defining a North Carolina state bank’s powers). 
 82 The BHCA prohibits a bank holding company from owning any company 
other than a bank. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a) (2012). There are, however, numerous 
exemptions to this general prohibition, including 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8), which 
permits ownership of a company whose activities are “so closely related to 
banking as to be a proper incident thereto.” Id. § 1843(c)(8). 
 83 National banks are regulated by the OCC. State chartered banks are regulated 
primarily by their state chartering authority, but are also subject to federal 
regulation by either the Federal Reserve Board for banks that have elected to 
become members of the Federal Reserve System by purchasing stock in their 
regional federal reserve bank, or the FDIC if they are nonmembers of the Federal 
Reserve System. 
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form a traditional national bank but now has to refile its application 
for deposit insurance with the FDIC.84 Nonetheless, Thomas Curry, 
an attorney and a former Comptroller of the Currency, believes that 
a “full-service, FDIC-insured bank with a fintech business plan”85 is 
the most likely entry point for fintechs into banking. 
B. Special Purpose National Bank Charter 
There has been a lot of buzz recently about a new option to the 
traditional state or national bank charter—a special purpose national 
bank charter (SPNB) for fintechs, which was finalized by the OCC 
in July 2018.86 The OCC issued a Policy Statement detailing the 
existing statutory and regulatory authorities that it said authorized 
the OCC to consider issuing a national bank charter to a fintech 
company that is “engaged in the business of banking but do[es] not 
take deposits.”87 Despite the OCC’s willingness to grant fintechs 
special purpose national bank charters under this broader 
construction of the National Bank Act, the Policy Statement noted 
 
 84 Rachel Witkowski, Fintechs May Finally Win Charter Chase in 2019, AM. 
BANKER (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/fintechs-may-
finally-win-charter-chase-in-2019 [https://perma.cc/UWK7-9B73]. 
 85 Id. 
 86 OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, POLICY STATEMENT ON 
FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES’ ELIGIBILITY TO APPLY FOR NATIONAL 
BANK CHARTERS 1, 1–4 (2018) [hereinafter OCC POLICY STATEMENT], 
https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2018/pub-other-occ-policy-
statement-fintech.pdf [https://perma.cc/PNF3-3ZLY] (“It is the policy of the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) to consider . . . . [A]pplications 
for special purpose national bank charters from financial technology (fintech) 
companies that are engaged in the business of banking but do not take deposits 
. . . . The OCC adopts this policy after careful consideration of the extensive 
stakeholder feedback and public comment received over the past two years.”); see 
TREASURY REPORT, supra note 66, at 70–73. 
 87 OCC POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 86, at 1–2. But see Recent Policy 
Statement – OCC Allows Fintech Companies to Apply for National Bank 
Charters, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1361, 1361–62 (2019) [hereinafter OCC Allows 
Fintechs to Apply for National Bank Charters] (“Though on first blush the OCC 
announcement seems like a welcome respite from regulation by all fifty states, 
many fintech companies will lack either eligibility or incentive to apply. However, 
the OCC’s move may put pressure on state regulators to improve their regulatory 
schemes and eventually may be a boon to many fintech companies.”). 
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that the OCC will require SPNB’s “to adhere to the same high 
standards that apply to all national banks.”88 
Even before issuing the Policy Statement, the OCC, and its plan 
for a special charter to adapt to technological changes in the banking 
industry,89 faced opposition from state regulators who strongly 
contested the OCC’s purported “authority to issue [special purpose 
national bank] charters to begin with.”90 Indeed, the OCC was sued 
in two separate suits by the Conference of State Bank Supervisors91 
and the New York State Department of Financial Services,92 
charging that a SPNB violates the National Bank Act by providing 
a federal bank charter to an entity that may pay checks, make loans, 
but not accept deposits.93 The argument is that you cannot be a bank 
unless you do all three.94 Further, it is argued that granting a federal 
 
 88 OCC POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 86, at 3. 
 89 See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, EXPLORING SPECIAL 
PURPOSE NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS FOR FINTECH COMPANIES 2, 3–15 (2016), 
https://www.occ.gov/topics/responsible-innovation/comments/special-purpose-
national-bank-charters-for-fintech.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZ28-ZAG5] 
(discussing the OCC’s potential consideration of fintech companies’ applications 
to become banks through special purpose national charters); see also OCC Allows 
Fintechs to Apply for National Bank Charters, supra note 87, at 1367 (discussing 
suits filed against the OCC for its “plan to charter fintech companies”). 
 90 OCC Allows Fintechs to Apply for National Bank Charters, supra note 87, at 
1367. 
 91 See Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. OCC, 313 F. Supp. 3d 285 
(D.D.C. 2018). 
 92 See Vullo v. OCC (Vullo I), No. 17 Civ. 3574, 2017 WL 6512245 (S.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 12, 2017); J. Preston Carter, OCC and CSBS File Replies in Suit to Block 
Fintech Charter, WOLTERS KLUWER (Feb. 28, 2019), 
https://lrus.wolterskluwer.com/news/banking-finance/occ-and-csbs-file-replies-
in-suit-to-block-fintech-charter/74306/ [https://perma.cc/FFX4-BRUN]; Rachel 
Witkowski, N.Y. State Refiles Suit to Block OCC’s ‘Reckless’ Fintech Charter, 
AM. BANKER (Sept. 14, 2018), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/ny-state-
refiles-suit-to-block-occs-reckless-fintech-charter [https://perma.cc/SB77-
QRNQ] (stating that the lawsuit calls the OCC charter “lawless, ill-conceived, a 
destabilizing of the financial markets”). 
 93 CSBS Sues OCC Over Fintech Charter, CSBS (Oct. 25, 2018), 
https://www.csbs.org/csbs-sues-occ-over-fintech-charter [https://perma.cc/52Q2-
T9XC]. 
 94 The National Bank Act defines the business of banking as including “all such 
incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking; by 
discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other 
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charter to an entity that is not a bank would allow the entity to 
preempt state statutes that conflict with its operations under the 
National Bank Act, a power that only banks with a national charter 
should have.95 
These arguments collide with a longstanding OCC regulation 
which provides that a 
national bank . . . may be a special purpose bank that limits 
its activities to fiduciary activities or to any other activities 
within the business of banking. A special purpose bank that 
conducts activities other than fiduciary activities must 
conduct at least one of the following three core banking 
functions: Receiving deposits; paying checks; or lending 
money.96 
Whether this regulation is consistent with the National Bank 
Act’s definition of banking is the question.97 
To date, no SPNB charters have been granted, but there is 
speculation that discussions with potential applicants have 
 
evidences of debt [paying checks]; by receiving deposits; . . . by loaning money 
on personal security . . . .” 12 U.S.C. § 24 (seventh) (2012) (emphasis added). The 
other two express powers listed in this provision are no longer relevant – “buying 
and selling exchange, coin, and bullion,” and “obtaining, issuing and circulating 
notes,” which is now done by the Federal Reserve. CSBS Sues OCC Over Fintech 
Charter, supra note 93. 
 95 See Lydia Beyoud, No Takers for Federal Fintech Charter as OCC Tangles 
with States, BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 27, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ 
banking-law/no-takers-for-federal-fintech-charter-as-occ-tangles-with-
states?context=article-related [https://perma.cc/9MM6-SQUM]. 
 96 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(e)(1)(i) (2019). 
 97 See supra note 94 (discussing definition of “banking” under the National 
Bank Act); cf. Thomas Curry & Jason Cabral, It’s a Mistake to Block the OCC’s 
Fintech Charter, AM. BANKER: BANKTHINK (Sept. 24, 2018), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/its-a-mistake-to-block-the-occs-
fintech-charter [https://perma.cc/BH8Y-ERBD] (“[F]rom a legal and public 
policy standpoint, a dynamic rather than static definition of ‘banking’ under a dual 
fintech system is consistent with the National Bank Act. This view creates healthy 
regulatory competition that promotes excellence in regulation and benefits all 
stakeholders and the public.”). 
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occurred.98 There is also an issue as to whether fintech firms would 
find the charter attractive if it does not guarantee access to the 
Federal Reserve’s payment system.99 Right now, since the entity 
would not collect federally insured deposits, that access is unlikely. 
The viability of SPNB charters as an option for fintechs seeking 
a bank charter remains uncertain for now. Although both lawsuits 
challenging the OCC’s plans for a SPNB charter were initially 
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,100 the New York 
State Department of Financial Services has since refiled its lawsuit 
against the OCC. The OCC then moved to dismiss, and all counts 
challenging the OCC’s authority to issue special purpose national 
bank charters to fintechs, except for those alleging Tenth 
Amendment violations, survived the motions to dismiss.101 The 
 
 98 Beyoud, supra note 95 (“Comptroller of the Currency Joseph Otting said in 
November [of 2018] that the agency expects to announce its first charter applicant 
by late 2018 or early 2019.”). 
 99 Id. (“The inability to take deposits and the OCC’s significant capital 
requirements are likely to deter smaller fintech startups from pursuing a charter 
. . . .”). 
 100 Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. OCC (CSBS I), 313 F. Supp. 3d 
285, 301–02 (D.D.C. 2018); Vullo I, No. 17 Civ. 3574, 2017 WL 6512245, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2017) (stating that at the time of suit, the OCC had neither 
determined whether it would in fact consider issuing special purpose national 
bank charters to fintech companies, nor “received or reviewed any applications 
for any such charter,” and thus, no injuries had yet been suffered to make any 
claims “ripe for adjudication”); see also OCC Allows Fintechs to Apply for 
National Bank Charters, supra note 87, at 1367 (“Both cases were dismissed on 
jurisdictional grounds.”). However, “[t]he suits are almost certain to be revived 
when the first [special purpose national bank] charter is granted . . . .” OCC 
Allows Fintechs to Apply for National Bank Charters, supra note 87, at 1367. 
 101 Vullo v. OCC (Vullo II), No. 18 Civ. 8377 (VM), 378 F. Supp. 3d 271, 278–
82 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2019). Perhaps significantly, in addition to denying the 
OCC’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim that issuing special purpose national 
bank charters to fintechs exceeds its statutory authority under the National Bank 
Act, the Vullo II court noted that  
 
it [was] not aware of the OCC ever having chartered a non-
depository entity as a national bank on the strength of the 
National Bank Act’s] “business of banking” clause. Rather, on 
the two occasions that the OCC began issuing national bank 
charters to a type of non-depository institution, Congress first 
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Conference of State Bank Supervisors refiled its suit and the OCC’s 
motion to dismiss was granted again based on lack of standing and 
an unripe claim (since no fintech has applied for a SPNB charter).102 
Even if the OCC is unsuccessful in supporting its ability to charter 
a SPNB, congressional legislation expanding the OCC’s authority 
remains a possibility.103 
C. State Industrial Loan Company Charter 
Another entry point into banking by a fintech firm is to consider 
establishing a state-chartered bank through an industrial loan 
company (ILC) charter.104 This is a state charter (so there is no 
federal preemption available),105 but there are two significant 
advantages to this point of entry. First, an ILC is considered a bank 
that has access to the federal payments system, discount window 
lending by the Federal Reserve, federal deposit insurance, and the 
ability to export state usury laws to apply to out-of-state 
borrowers.106 Second, nonbanking companies may own ILCs, and 
even though the state ILC charter is a bank charter, the owners of 
ILCs are excepted from application of the BHCA because an ILC is 
exempted from the BHCA definition of “bank.”107 The BHCA 
covers a “company which has control over any bank”108 and it 
restricts the activities of the bank holding company and any 
nonbanking subsidiaries it owns to those that are “closely related to 
banking”109 or, in the case of a bank holding company that qualifies 
to be designated by the Federal Reserve Board as a financial holding 
 
amended the [National Bank Act] explicitly to authorize the 
OCC to do so. 
 
Id. at 295. 
 102 Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. OCC (CSBS II), No. 18-cv-2449 
(DLF), 2019 WL 4194541, at *1, *3–4 (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 2019). 
 103 See Vullo II, 378 F. Supp. 3d at 295. 
 104 See Witkowski, Are Fintechs Better Off Taking ILC Route, supra note 76. 
 105 See id. 
 106 Id.; Clozel, supra note 76. 
 107 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(H) (2012); Witkowski, Are Fintechs Better Off 
Taking ILC Route, supra note 76. 
 108 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1). 
 109 Id. § 1843(c)(8). 
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company, to activities that are “financial in nature.”110 Without these 
BHCA activity limitations, a company engaged in nonbanking or 
nonfinancial business could own an ILC and through the ILC engage 
in fintech activities as well as enjoy some of the benefits of being a 
bank provided by the ILC charter.111 
A substantial limitation exists with this ILC option for fintechs, 
however, in that it is only available in a handful of states, and other 
states may not add this charter type because only ILCs organized 
under the laws of a state which permitted such an entity on March 
5, 1987 are excepted from the BHCA definition of ‘bank.”112 Utah 
is the state of choice for entities seeking to charter an ILC, or what 
Utah has called in recent years, an “industrial bank.”113 One 
prominent ILC based in Utah is the BMW Bank of North America, 
which provides banking services to BMW customers.114 
Indeed, Square, Inc., the payments processing company that uses 
a small square device attached to a phone to process debit and credit 
card transactions, has applied for a Utah industrial bank charter, and 
the FDIC is currently considering its application for deposit 
insurance.115 As you might imagine, this is not without 
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controversy.116 The FDIC extended the comment period for those 
who want to comment on Square’s deposit insurance application in 
early 2019.117 In February 2019, a number of community groups 
wrote to the FDIC urging it to reject Square’s application based on 
its proposed plan to comply with the Community Reinvestment Act 
(CRA).118 The CRA requires that deposit-taking institutions meet the 
credit needs of their “entire community including low- and 
moderate-income neighborhoods.”119 The CRA is sort of a quid pro 
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quo for receiving federal deposit insurance.120 Square’s critics said 
its CRA plan was too narrow in focusing only on areas around its 
proposed Salt Lake City headquarters and ignoring its national 
footprint in general and its parent company’s California location in 
particular.121 The letter filed by the community groups objecting to 
Square’s application said the “FDIC will risk becoming the agency 
of choice for questionable fintech firms that seek a pathway to the 
cheap funding source . . . and other benefits that a bank charter may 
provide.”122 
The American Bankers Association and the Bank Policy 
Institute, trade associations for banking organizations, recently 
joined together to write a letter to the FDIC opposing an application 
for deposit insurance filed for Rakuten Bank America, which is 
seeking a charter as a Utah industrial bank or ILC.123 Their objection 
is, in part, that the parent is a non-financial business that is not 
subject to consolidated supervision and activity limitations.124 The 
commenters worry that the bank’s business plan is too dependent on 
the success of its non-financial affiliates in the e-commerce market 
and that trouble in that non-financial marketplace could lead to the 
industrial bank’s failure to the detriment of the federal deposit 
insurance fund.125 
We will be able to watch with interest over the coming months 
and years as fintech firms attempt to establish banking operations 
through a bank charter, the special purpose national bank charter, or 
the ILC route. It is way too early to tell if fintechs will decide to use 
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the bank charter option to directly provide DLT or other fintech-
enabled financial services or develop applications on their own. Will 
fintechs be the dominant players? Or will banks develop DLT or 
other fintech applications on their own, or with fintech partners? 
IV. VOLUME, VELOCITY, AND SYSTEMIC RISK 
But back to Bitcoin and DLT in banking. This brave new world 
will arrive soon. There are clearly numerous benefits to DLT-
enabled payment systems in terms of speed and cost. There are also 
drawbacks that we should keep in mind as innovation occurs in this 
space. In closing, I want to reference a note of caution sounded by 
Professor Saule Omarova, a former colleague at UNC School of 
Law and a very well regarded scholar, in a 2019 article.126 While she 
acknowledges that fintech firms emphasize the public benefits of 
financial inclusion, greater financial autonomy, and increased 
convenience,127 she also notes that the technology permits private 
actors to synthesize tradable financial claims generating new 
financial risks on an unprecedented scale, by removing frictions in 
the system that enable the scaling-up of the volume and velocity of 
trading activity in the financial markets.128 Professor Omarova 
worries that this will make the markets “more volatile and 
unstable”129 and make it more “difficult, if not impossible, for the 
public to control, or even track, new technology-driven proliferation 
of risk in the financial system.”130 I believe her cautionary statements 
should be taken to heart. As we enter this brave new world with 
technology-enabled enhancements to the financial system, we 
should consider the unintended consequences of the increase of 
“volume and velocity”131 of activity in financial markets and 
consider the new risks this increase imposes and how they may best 
be mitigated. 
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Bitcoin and DLT will surely play a role in banking as we move 
forward. JPMorgan Chase and Goldman Sachs are leading the 
charge in exploring using DLT to make payments. Banks may also 
find other applications that can be enhanced by DLT. Fintech firms 
are exploring whether they should become a bank and utilize their 
DLT from a bank charter. In either case, legislatures, regulators, and 
other policy makers need to carefully consider how these new 
players and technologies may change the functioning of the markets 
and be prepared to respond to those changes. 
